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Abstract 
Student achievement has been identified as an important contributor to economic growth. This 
paper investigates the relationship between redistributive government activities and 
investment in human capital measured by student performance in international comparative 
tests in Mathematics and Science during the period 1980 to 2003. In fixed effects panel 
models, government consumption, government social expenditures, and the progressivity of 
the income tax system have negative effects on student achievement. These results are robust 
to a variety of model specifications, such as conditioning on educational expenditures, and 
alternative measures of student performance from the World Bank. Our estimates indicate that 
increased government size by 10 percent reduces student achievement by 0.1 standard 
deviations.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The equity-efficiency quandary of the welfare state is usually attributed to the incentive 
structure in the labor market. The welfare state includes ‘unproductive’ government spending 
which reduces the return to work and is financed by distortionary taxes. Apparently, little 
evidence exists on the effect of welfare state arrangements on investment in human capital.  
 
The welfare state can be seen as a social insurance mechanism, see for example Sinn (1995). 
When the insurance terms for the insured improve, her incentives to invest in order to avoid 
capture are weakened. In a macroeconomic context, this moral hazard problem may have 
detrimental effects on investment in human capital, saving, and, ultimately, economic 
growth.1 Indeed, welfare state arrangements may also be seen as interventions in imperfect 
markets, working in the opposite direction. The evidence on public sector size and economic 
growth in empirical cross-country studies, however, indicates a negative relationship.2 Ehrlich 
and Zhong (1998) and Ehrlich and Kim (2007) look directly at investment in human capital, 
and find a negative effect of old-age pension benefits on secondary school enrolment rates, in 
particular for developed countries.3 Using German data, Fossen and Glocker (2011) find that 
university enrollment is positively related to expected return to tertiary education. 
 
To our best knowledge, we are among the first to empirically investigate to what extent 
government redistribution activities affect individual investment in human capital. In this 
study, we approximate the former through three, partly overlapping measures of welfare state 
generosity: government consumption, social expenditures, and the progressivity of the tax 
system. We use achievement on international student tests, adjusted to facilitate comparability 
across countries and time, as measure of investment in human capital. Most of the existing 
empirical analyses on economic growth employ as a proxy of human capital some measure of 
quantity of education in the population. This is obviously a crude measure, and we follow 
Wössmann (2003) who argues that the number of quality-education-years varies across 
countries stronger than the mere duration of education, with which it might even be 
uncorrelated. Indeed, Hanushek and Kimko (2000) and Hanushek and Wössmann (2008, 
                                                
1 In addition, Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer (2007) find that higher government consumption spending is related 
to less subjective well-being, perhaps through misallocation of resources or the inefficiencies generated through 
modern taxation schemes. 
2 For example Fölster and Henrekson (2001), Romero-Avila and Strauch (2008) and Bergh and Karlsson (2010) 
find negative effects on growth of various measures of government size. Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1999) 
distinguish between different types of taxes and spending categories, and find that distortionary taxation reduces 
growth whilst productive government expenditure enhances growth, a result in accordance with Romero-Avila 
and Strauch (2008). Agell, Ohlsson and Thoursie (2006) argue that the estimated relationships are not causal. 
3 Zhang and Zhang (2004) find the opposite relationship. Ehrlich and Kim (2007) report that - not unsurprisingly 
in a growth context - the estimates are sensitive to whether the models condition on initial GDP or not.  
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2012) find that average student achievement in compulsory schooling is a much more sizable 
determinant of economic growth than years of education in the population.  
 
Analyses of general-equilibrium effects of macro-incentives must necessarily be done on 
aggregated data, which might come at the cost of credible identification. We construct an 
unbalanced country panel that utilizes data on comparative international tests in Mathematics 
and Science for the age group 13-15 years and includes eight tests in the period 1980-2003 for 
a maximum of 79 countries. We construct a synthetic time-series cross-section (‘synthetic 
panel’) of aggregated individual test scores that allows the application of panel estimation 
methods. This approach improves methodologically on previous studies that exploit cross-
country variation in student achievement mainly in a cross-sectional framework, either based 
on one single cross-section of individual student performance data or a cross-section of 
country aggregates that have been averaged over several years, as in, e.g., Hanushek and 
Kimko (2000) and Hanushek and Wössmann (2008, 2012).4 In contrast, we use country-year 
aggregates of individual test score data, and exploit the panel structure by estimating fixed 
effects models that account for unobserved heterogeneity across countries and common time-
specific macroeconomic developments around the world.  
 
Our difference-in-differences approach suggests that more government redistribution 
activities exert an investment-lowering effect on students – be it either through the provision 
of goods (e.g. hospitals), but also through direct financial transfers to households (e.g. pension 
spending and active labor market policies), or when measured indirectly through the 
progressivity of the income tax schedule. The results are robust to a variety of model 
specifications, including models that condition on educational expenditures and the teacher-
student ratio. The negative effect of welfare state generosity seems not to be mediated by 
resource use in education. Our finding is corroborated when we replace student performance 
in Mathematics and Science with the general survival rate in lower secondary education. 
 
This analysis is related to the literature on educational effects of cash transfer programs in 
developing countries, which typically transfer money to poor families conditional on their 
investments in human capital. These evaluations provide clear evidence of positive effects on 
student enrollment and reduced dropout rates (see, e.g., the review by Rawlings and Rubio, 
2005). However, such programs are not representative for the main portion of public 
expenditures because they generate direct incentives for schooling. The evidence for 
developing countries also indicates that the cash transfer programs have no effect on student 
achievement (Ponce and Bedi, 2008; Behrman et al., 2009). 
  
                                                
4 The only exception seems to be Barro and Lee (2001a), who employ a panel of countries participating in 
international tests up to 1990 to estimate the effect of school inputs on student achievement. 
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The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents some theoretical considerations on 
the effect of government redistributive activities on the accumulation of skills through 
schooling. Section 3 describes the international student tests data and our measure of adjusted 
average student performance, and introduces our three measures of welfare state generosity. 
Section 4 presents the empirical model. Section 5 provides the main empirical findings and 
presents robustness tests related to potential omitted variables, results for subsamples, and 
alternative measures of student performance. Section 6 offers some concluding comments. 
 
 
2. Theoretical considerations 
 
The insurance aspect of the welfare state manifests in a system that, first, reduces the risk 
related to future income and, second, redistributes from individuals with high income to 
individuals with low income. Numerous papers have analyzed the relationship between 
taxation, uncertainty, and education incentives, including Levhari and Weiss (1974), Eaton 
and Rosen (1980), Hamilton (1987), Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), Heckman et al. (1998a, 
b), Andersson and Konrad (2003), Konrad and Spadaro (2006), and Poutvaara (2007). This 
literature shows that the impact of risk on human capital investment is ambiguous because 
risk can take on many different forms.   
 
In our empirical approach we regard observed student achievement at a specific schooling age 
as reflecting accumulated human capital investment up to that specific age. In the economics 
of education literature, individual’s costly investment activity relating to schooling includes  
‘student effort’. Traditional economics assumes that optimal investment is the outcome of a 
life-time utility maximization where investment takes place in earlier periods while 
consumption takes place in later periods. In real-life, however, student’s effort is determined 
not only by selfish utility maximization over life-time, but also by instructions of parents and 
teachers. More specifically, parents might be concerned about student effort at school because 
of their own altruistic and dynastic preferences. Teachers might view their work as a mission, 
but might also respond to incentive structures of wages and promotion. In addition, the 
general view in society on the importance of skills and knowledge is also expected to 
influence behavior of students, parents and teachers. In sum, the actually observed student 
effort is likely to be a result of not only students’ own classical utility maximization, but also 
behavior of parents and teachers, and national traits such as culture and population risk 
aversion. 
 
In a utility maximization model with costly investment that determines income levels later in 
life, the marginal cost of student’s effort is equal to her expected (discounted) marginal return 
to this effort. Welfare state arrangements play a role in this optimization problem by 
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influencing (i) the level of income and (ii) risk and uncertainty, in each possible 
environmental state. First, viewing the welfare state as an insurance device that transfers 
income from individuals with high earnings to individuals with low earnings, the traditional 
human capital model (Becker, 1964) predicts that increased redistribution of income weaken 
the incentive to invest in education. Indeed, the empirical study by Heckman et al. (1998a, b) 
shows that a progressive income tax system yields lower incentives to invest in human capital 
than a proportional tax system. Second, welfare state arrangements may also reduce the 
uncertainty and risks attached to the return to investment in human capital for the population. 
The insight from Levhari and Weiss (1974) is that reduced uncertainty in the return to human 
capital investments increases the investments because individuals dislike risk. The result that 
lower volatility in the return to schooling increases education investment is, however, not 
universally true, but depends on theoretical assumptions. For example. Hogan and Walker 
(2007) and Jacobs (2007) show that investment is positively related to the uncertainty in the 
labor market when educational choices are modelled in a real option framework.5 
 
The implicit aggregate function of human capital investment, H, can be written 
 
( )H H g, y;Z= ,  (1) 
 
where g captures welfare state arrangements, y is average income, and Z reflects country 
specific factors such as culture for education. We predict that educational investment H 
decreases in y  if individuals’ utility functions are concave, while the effect of g is in general 
ambiguous as it impacts income level and uncertainty likewise. However, we believe that 
redistribution of income is the dominating aspect of the welfare state, which has a negative 
effect on H.  
 
Our testable hypothesis is that a more generous welfare state lowers students’ educational 
investments, i.e., effort level during schooling, measured by the international achievement 
tests.  
 
 
3. Data 
 
3.1. International measures of student achievement 
We rely on comparative international tests of student achievement conducted by different 
international organizations. The International Association for the Evaluation of Educational 
                                                
5 For a more in-depth theoretical discussion of how welfare state arrangement might affect students’ educational 
investment decisions, see Falch and Fischer (2011).  
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Achievement (IEA) has been responsible for the largest number of such tests, among them the 
TIMSS tests, but also the OECD has developed a Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA).  
 
We construct a synthetic panel data set of national averages of individual student performance 
in international tests covering a period of almost 25 years (1980 – 2003). Individual level data 
is not available for the tests prior to 1994/95, and the gain of exploiting micro-variation is 
limited in our setting because measures of government activities vary only at the national 
level. The tests cover the core subjects Reading, Mathematics and Natural Science separately, 
but we restrict our attention to student assessments in Mathematics and Science for several 
reasons. First, these two subjects have more similarities among each other than with Reading 
and are thus more suitable for constructing a synthetic panel. Second, reading skills have been  
tested less regularly, and even within the same test and year, these tests might potentially 
differ considerably by language. Third, performance in Mathematics and Natural Science are 
more likely to determine a country’s innovativeness in an economic growth context, as 
empirically tested in Hanushek and Kimko (2000) and Hanushek and Wössmann (2008, 
2012). Comparability of test results is also given in the age dimension, as all tests included are 
conducted on middle-aged students (13-15 years). Choosing this age group has also the 
advantage that compulsory schooling still applies, mitigating selection out of education issues. 
The tests we utilize are described in Table 1.6 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
Recently, it has become common to report national averages based on the Items Response 
Theory which weights the different questions by their difficulty (“Warm estimates”, Warm, 
1989), and standardizes the scores such that the average across all participating students and  
countries is 500 with the standard deviation of 100. Particularly the PISA studies employ this 
methodology. With this approach, the average score of a particular country will depend on the 
achievement of the students in the other participating countries. Thus, since the composition 
                                                
6 Even though all tests are in the fields ‘Mathematics’ and ‘Science’, they do not necessarily test the same 
cognitive skills: The IEA tests are related to common elements of school curricula across countries while IAEP is 
geared towards the curriculum in USA building on the national testing procedures developed by the National 
Assessment of Education Progress NAEP. The OECD PISA test has a more real-world approach and claims to 
assess the skills that are considered to be essential for full participation in the society. The high correlation 
coefficient between the (adjusted) test results across various test types suggests that these differences are not 
important with respect to measured student performance. For the 18 countries participating both in TIMSS 2003 
and PISA 2003, the correlation is 0.94, while the correlation between the average Science and Mathematics score 
in TIMSS-repeat 1999 and PISA 2000 is 0.87, and the corresponding number for IAEP 1991 and TIMSS 1995 is 
0.80. Interestingly, as can be seen from Figure 2 below, USA had its poorest performance in the IAEP test that 
was based on the US school curriculum. 
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of participating countries changes across test years, the raw test scores for a particular country 
are not comparable over time. In addition, for the tests prior to 1991 “Warm estimates” have 
not been calculated so that we have to rely on the share of correct answers for these tests.7  
 
To make the scores on the different international tests comparable on a common metric, we 
have re-scaled the average scores for each international test by the following procedure. First 
we calculate the average of the Mathematics and Science tests when both subjects are tested. 
Second, we standardize the average score for each test to have mean zero and standard 
deviation equal to unity for a “core” group of 15 countries. The “core” is defined as the 
countries that have participated in at least six out of the eight international tests reported in 
Table 1, namely Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Korea, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Russia, Sweden, Thailand, UK, and USA.8 Third, we re-scale the 
scores for each of the remaining countries using the same parameters as for the “core” 
countries. Finally, since some countries participated in two parallel tests in 2003 (TIMSS and 
PISA), we calculate the average adjusted test score based on both tests in 2003. 
 
Making the results from different tests comparable across time has been a challenge also for 
previous empirical studies. For example, Hanushek and Kimko (2000) calculate a measure of 
labor-force quality based on the percent of correct answers in international student 
achievement tests for the period 1965-1991. They adjust the mean for each test, but not the 
variance (except the linear scaling that follows from the adjustment of the mean). Adjusting 
the means across tests is crucial in their analysis because they subsequently calculate an 
aggregated 30-year average quality measure for each country. More recently, Hanushek and 
Wössmann (2012) use student performance tests from TIMSS, PISA and the IEA up to 2003 
and, in addition to adjusting the means, correct the dispersion of each single test in a similar 
way as we do.9  
 
Figure 1a shows that the density of our measure of student achievement across the 15 “core” 
countries observations is close to the normal distribution. The density for all observations 
presented in Figure 1b has a long left tail, illustrating that some countries, mostly developing 
countries that participate less frequently in international tests, have low student achievement.  
  
                                                
7 We have compared the Warm estimates and percent correct answers for the IEA tests in 1994-95 and 1998-99 
for which both measures are available. The correlation coefficients for Mathematics are 0.997 and 0.982, 
respectively, and for Science 0.994 and 0.977, respectively. Thus, the differences across countries do not seem to 
be influenced in any important way by the choice of scale. 
8 More precisely, we standardize the score for those of the “core” countries that participated in the particular test. 
Out of the 15 “core” countries used to standardize the test scores, the data sources reports results for 11 countries 
in 1980-81, 12 in 1983-84, 8 in 1990-91, 15 in 1994-1995, 14 in 1998-99, 15 in OECD 2000, 13 in TIMSS 2003 
and 13 in OECD 2003. Only USA has test scores for all tests. 
9 Hanushek and Wössmann (2012) use as their “core” countries the 13 OECD countries that had “half or more of 
the relevant population attaining a secondary education in the 1960s”. 
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-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 1a and 1b about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
In a model with country-specific fixed effects, identification is only based on within-country 
variation. Figure 2 shows the development of test score averages over time for the “core” 
countries. The figure indicates that there are some systematic changes. For example, the 
relative achievement in the more neo-liberal Western economies USA, Canada, and UK 
increased during the 1990s, while the achievement declined in Israel and in the transition 
countries Russia and Hungary. Some countries perform consistently better than others. For 
example, Italy performs below average and Netherlands performs above average in each test. 
However, Figure 3 shows that there is quite some variation in the change in student 
achievement, although the variation is lower than that for the distribution in levels of 
achievement.10 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 2 and 3 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
  
Appendix Table A1 presents the 72 countries participating in the relevant international tests of 
student performance. 16 countries have only conducted one test, and will thus not contribute 
to the identification in models with country fixed effects. The table shows that the average test 
score is typically low in developing countries, and that the overall within-country variation is 
relatively high.11 
 
3.2. Independent variables: welfare state generosity and controls 
Our focal determinant of student performance in this analysis is the generosity of welfare state 
arrangements which is made operational in three ways: Firstly, we employ general 
government consumption spending (in percentage of GDP), obtained from the WDI (2007) 
database of the World Bank, a widely used measure of government production of goods and 
services that has been employed in various cross-country growth studies (Fölster and 
Henrekson, 2001, Agell et al., 2006) and happiness studies (Bjørnskov, Dreher, and Fischer, 
2007 and 2008). Government consumption excludes financial transfers to single households, 
but includes the government production of goods and services, which are mostly financed by 
taxes. For example, government consumption spending includes expenses for hospitals, 
infrastructure, public transport, schools and culture – state expenses which all relax the 
                                                
10 In Figure 3, only observations with at most eight years interval are utilized. 
11 The within-country variation tends to be high in countries with declining test scores such as Bulgaria and 
Hungary. Singapore had an exceptionally high score in TIMSS 1995. 
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income constraint on private households’ consumption now and in the future. In addition, 
given that most publicly provided goods are financed through progressive tax systems, they 
entail a consumption redistribution aspect. Following the traditional public finance literature, 
we will refer to this measure as ‘government consumption’.  
 
Secondly, we use public sector social expenditures (in percentage of GDP) that are obtained 
from OECD Social Expenditure database (SOCX) and include aggregated public welfare 
expenses of all government tiers.12 This measure captures direct transfers from government 
institutions to single households, including “benefits to, and financial contributions targeted 
at, households and individuals in order to provide support during circumstances which 
adversely affect their welfare, provided that the provision of the benefits and financial 
contributions constitutes neither a direct payment for a particular good or service nor an 
individual contract or transfer” (OECD, 2007, p. 7). OECD defines expenditures as ‘social’ if 
they satisfy two criteria: first, they have to intend a social purpose, and, second, these 
programs must be based on either inter-personal redistribution or compulsory participation 
(OECD, 2007, p. 8). They take the form of “cash benefits (e.g. pensions, income support 
during maternity leave, and social assistance payments), social services (e.g. childcare, care 
for the elderly and disabled) and tax breaks with a social purpose (e.g. tax expenditures 
towards families with children, or favorable tax treatment of contributions to private health 
plans)” (ibidem, p. 7), excluding the administrative costs of executing them.  
 
By employing separate components of public social expenditure, we are able to differentiate 
government transfers by social policy area as follows: pension payments, unemployment 
benefits, active labor market policy spending, family allowances, health care (service) 
spending, housing subsidies, and ‘other spending’. Table 2 provides an overview of spending 
components. The major population is, in principle, entitled to all those spending programs so 
that each may exert an independent effect of its own. The correlation coefficient between 
government consumption spending and total social spending is equal to 0.67 in our sample. 
 
Figure 4 presents within-country variation in total social expenditures as a share of GDP for 
the “core” countries. There is a tendency of increased social expenditures during the period of 
investigation: the average share of social expenditures in Figure 4 increased from 17%- in 
1980 to 19% in 2003.13 The Netherlands is the only country which cut down social 
expenditures, while Japan has experienced the largest growth. Note that social expenditures as 
                                                
12 The OECD defines expenditures as ‘public’ (as opposed to being ’private’) when institutions of the ‘General 
Government’ control the relevant financial flows. The ‘General Government’ in this context includes different 
levels of government and social security funds. This definition of ‘public’ includes, often by tradition, transfers 
by compulsory social insurances and social assistance schemes (see also OECD 2007, p.8-10). 
13 For all 29 OECD countries included in the empirical analyses, social expenditures increase from 17 percent of 
GDP in 1980 to 21 percent in 2003. 
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a share of GDP serve as automatic stabilizers and, thus, typically shrink during a boom and 
expand during a recession. Thus, it is important to include GDP in the empirical model in 
order to avoid identification on variation in national income. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
Table 3 presents some descriptive statistics on government consumption in the world sample, 
and total social expenditures for OECD countries, including its single components. The 
variance in social expenditures is slightly higher than that for government consumption, both 
overall and within countries. The within country variation, for which we identify the effects 
on student achievement, constitutes 7-8 percent of the overall variance. Pension spending is 
the largest component of social expenditures, followed by public health spending.   
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
The third measure of the generosity of the welfare state that we employ is an index of income 
tax rate progressivity developed by the Fraser Institute (Gwartney and Lawson, 2002). The 
index constitutes an income-bracket adjusted marginal tax rate levied in the highest income 
bracket in one country, adjusted for the lowest income threshold for this income bracket. The 
redistributive impact of a given tax rate depends on the financial threshold the rate applies on. 
Since the index is adjusted for threshold effects it facilitates comparability of the marginal top 
income tax rate across countries and time. Progressive taxes are redistributive as they relax the 
financial constraint on poor households relative to richer households, but also since they 
finance provision of goods and services that equalize consumption patterns between the rich 
and the poor. The index of income tax progressivity ranges from 0 to 10, with higher values 
representing a higher top tax rate, and, thus, more redistribution of income. Between 1970 and 
2000, data have been collected every five years, and annually from 2000.14  
 
The regression-sample within-country variation for our three measures of welfare state 
generosity is presented in Appendix Table A1. For countries with relatively large variation in 
                                                
14 There is not a perfect match between the years of student achievement tests and the years for which the tax 
progressivity measure is available on a quinquennial basis prior to the year 2000. We therefore choose to linearly 
interpolate the missing values prior to 2000. An alternative method would be to relate student achievement to the 
tax progressivity observed most closely in time – this way, both years 1980 and 1981, 1990 and 1991, 1994 and 
1995, 1998-2000 are related each with identical values of quinquennial tax progressivity. By this procedure, the 
variation in tax progressivity is reduced, but the empirical results are qualitatively identical (see Section 5.3). 
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one or two variables, the variation of the third variable is often similar to the average. For 
example, during the 1990s Korea increased rapidly both social expenditures and the 
progressivity of the tax system, but without changing government consumption. On the other 
hand, in Ireland and the UK government consumption and tax progressivity declined 
markedly in the 1990s without much change in social expenditures. Thus, the subsample of 
countries that contribute most to the within-country variation in the empirical analysis will 
differ across the three measures.  
 
Annual GDP and population data are taken from the WDI 2007 database. Adult education 
attainment is taken from Barro and Lee (2001b), which are available on a quinquennial basis 
up to the year 2000.15; missing values prior to 2000 have been linearly interpolated. We use 
the 3-years lag of the percentage of the population over age 25 with secondary school attained 
in order to include also the international tests after the year 2000 in the empirical analysis. In 
some robustness tests, we also use current data on primary school educational expenditures 
(% GDP) and pupil-teacher ratios from the World Bank16, and the survival rate, that is the 
share of entrants in secondary education actually attaining a lower secondary degree, obtained 
from the World Bank (WDI, 2007, updated 2014).  
 
 
4. Model specification and identification 
 
We estimate the following model for student achievement H of country i in year t. 
 
1 2 3 4log( / ) log( )=β +β +β +β +φ +ϕ + εit it it it it i t itH g GDP POP POP EDU , (2) 
 
where git is the measure of the welfare state generosity and GDP per capita (GDP/POP) is the 
proxy for mean income in equation (1) in section 2. Family characteristics as parental income 
and education have strong effects in micro studies of student achievement, which is why we 
also include the share of adult population with at least some secondary education (EDU). 
Since we measure GDP in per capita terms, we also employ population size (POP). The time 
fixed effects ϕt  account for macro-developments common to all countries, e.g. financial 
market crises and global recessions, but also for the fact that most of the independent 
                                                
15 Again, we use linear interpolation for the years between the actual observations of adult education attainment 
in order to match this variable to observed student test scores. Also in this case is the qualitative results are 
clearly the same as reported below.  
16 From 1990 on, these data have roughly been collected on an annual basis. Again, we linearly interpolate the 
variables when there are missing values for at up to five years and consider the information as missing if it is not 
measured in a five-year period. 
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variables have positive trends.17 Country-specific fixed effects iφ  account for time-invariant 
differences between countries.  
 
In general, analyses of macro-incentives are carried out at an aggregated level at which the 
variation in the variables of interest occurs. Since welfare state arrangements typically do not 
vary within countries, but across countries and across time, our approach is to use country 
level data. 
 
Including country fixed effects in the model, which amounts to a difference-in-differences 
specification, is essential in order to interpret the estimated relationships. The school systems 
vary greatly across countries, for example with respect to school starting age and early 
tracking of students. In addition there might be differences across countries in culture for 
learning, risk aversion, and labor market institutions that are important for students’ 
investment decisions. However, all these characteristics change slowly at the national level, 
and are thus to a major extent captured by the country fixed effects. 
 
One must, of course, be careful in interpreting the estimated relationship between welfare 
state generosity and student performance as causal. There are several potential threats to our 
identification approach. First, sufficient within-country variation in the variables of interest is 
a necessary identifying condition. The descriptive statistics (Table 3) in the previous section 
indicate that this is indeed the case in our data. Second, another source of concern is that there 
may be important but unobservable factors that vary over time in a way that is correlated with 
the variables of interest; the omission of those factors would bias our results. In addition, in 
the case of measurement error the signal-to-noise ratio might be weak in fixed effects models. 
Finally, another source of bias might in principle arise from reverse causality; public policy 
might respond on dissatisfactory school performance.  
 
We consider the likelihood of biased estimates in our relatively simple model specification by 
investigating the robustness of our results in several ways. First, we employ various measures 
of welfare state generosity which differ by their within-country variation and we expand the 
model to include educational spending, unemployment, and the age composition of the 
population. In addition, we estimate models with county specific trends to capture potentially 
differing development patterns across countries. While the latter specification obviously better 
controls for potentially omitted variables, it might also weaken the signal-to-noise ratio to the 
extent that (residual) welfare state arrangements change too slowly for identification. Further, 
                                                
17 Notice that including time-specific effects may influence the interpretation of the results, as we discuss later. 
The scaling of the test scores makes the scores comparable over time so that, by including time fixed effects, the 
model in essence draws inference on which other countries that participated on the different test and year. Thus, 
we also report results where the time-specific effects are replaced by a simple trend.  
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we estimate separate models for OECD countries that arguable are more homogenous that the 
world sample.  
 
In order to address such biases the instrumental variable technique is an alternative approach. 
We think, however, that it is hard to think about valid instruments for welfare state 
arrangements in a cross-country framework. There are some attempts in the literature to use 
instruments in cross-country analyses. For example, Acemoglu et al. (2001) use European 
mortality rates in colonies as instrument for present institutional quality. This is, however, a 
disputed approach (Albouy, 2012), and it relies on variation across developing countries while 
we focus on developed countries. With respect to reverse causality, conventional wisdom 
suggests that it is not a major issue in our analysis: even if welfare reforms often are related to 
poor economic performance and problems in the labor market, unsatisfactory performance of 
schools is to our knowledge not used as an argument for reduced generosity of welfare state 
arrangements. 
 
Finally, we have to discuss the various dynamic patterns of welfare state generosity that we 
employ in contemporaneous measures. Theoretically, it is the expected welfare state 
arrangements in the future that affect educational investment decisions today. We argue that, 
in our empirical framework, the contemporaneous level of government redistribution activities 
might be the best proxy for individuals’ expectations. The average spending level over time 
that may persist due to a status quo bias through a country’s institutions is captured by the 
country fixed effects. However, it is the short-term within-country changes, conditional on 
GDP and population size, that drive the results in our model specification. As educational 
production is cumulative, expectations of students and parents at earlier grades in the past are 
important for observed achievement today at the student age of 13-15 years. Thus, 
contemporaneous levels of government welfare spending are to some extent a leaded measure 
for the real decisions made by students’ parents in the past. However, we will also investigate 
the robustness of the results by using five-years moving averages in the independent variables 
in some model specifications. 
 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
5.1. Government consumption 
Table 4 presents results for government consumption spending including 59 countries and 208 
observations. The first column simply presents the correlation between student achievement 
and government consumption spending as share of GDP. There is no unconditional 
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correlation.18 Column (2) includes the control variables GDP per capita, adult educational 
attainment w.r.t. secondary education, population size, and time-specific fixed effects. The 
number of observations drops due to missing observations for adult education for some 
countries. As expected, we find strong positive effects of GDP per capita and adult education. 
The positive income effect mirrors Hanushek and Kimko (2000) who report a positive effect 
of student achievement on economic growth, and is in accordance with micro evidence on the 
effect of parental income on student performance. However, the result for GDP is not in 
accordance with our testable hypothesis that assumes a concave utility function. The positive 
effect of adult educational attainment mirrors results from previous micro-econometric 
studies.  
 
The conditional effect of government consumption spending in column (2) is negative, as 
expected, appears sizeable and is significant at the 1 percent level. Thus, conditional on 
income, a small public sector is favorable as it increases student performance, and conditional 
on public sector size, students in rich and well-educated countries perform better than those 
living in poor and low-educated countries. When the share of government consumption 
increases by 0.1 log-points (approximately 10 percent) student achievement declines by 0.15 
“core” country standard deviations. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
Columns (3) to (5) of Table 4 present models with country fixed effects that mitigate a 
potential omitted variable problem.19 However, including country fixed effects in addition to 
year effects in column (3) does not change the point estimates of GDP and adult education 
attainment much compared to column (2), although the standard errors are twice as large as in 
the model with only time fixed effects (column (2)). On the other hand, the estimate of 
government consumption is small and insignificant.  
 
                                                
18 In order to compare the results in this unconditional model with models that include control variables, we only 
include the observations where the control variables are observed. In the full sample we have 232 observations in 
72 countries for student achievement. Estimating the unconditional model in column (1) in Table 4 on this full 
sample, the relationship with government consumption is equally insignificant (coefficient of 0.107 and standard 
error of 0.414).   
19 For 11 countries, we have only one observation. These countries do not contribute to the identification in the 
fixed effect models. If we exclude these countries from the model without country fixed effects (column (2)), the 
effect of government consumption remains negative and significant (the point estimate changes from -1.46 to -
1.22) For another 10 countries, we have only two observations. These countries do not contribute to the 
identification in the models with country specific trends in addition to the country fixed effect model. If we 
exclude these countries from the model with country fixed effects (column (3)), the effect of government 
consumption remains negative but insignificant (the point estimated changes from -0.65 to -0.71).     
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In these fixed effects models, our variable of interest becomes sometimes insignificant so that 
identification of its effects needs to be discussed. The relative large standard errors in the 
models with country fixed effects in columns (3) to (5) may indicate that the within-country 
variations in student achievement and government consumption are too small for statistical 
identification. Notably, the OLS R2 is as high as 0.94. However, it may equally be that it is the 
time-specific effects that complicate identification, e.g. in column (3). The purpose of the 
scaling of the test scores described above is to make the scores comparable over time. In 
consequence, with time-specific fixed effects, the model in essence draws inference on the 
change in composition of participating countries in a particular test and year. Our motivation 
for including year effects is that, on average, all the independent variables have positive 
trends. Indeed, while the p-value of joint significance of the time-specific fixed effects is 0.02 
in the model in column (3) in Table 4, the p-value is only 0.13 when a simple trend is added. 
For this reason, we replace in column (4) the time fixed effects with such a time trend. The 
coefficient of the trend variable is negative, indicating a positive trend in the other 
independent determinants, as expected. The OLS R2 appears only marginally lowered, while 
the within-R2 is clearly reduced. Interestingly, the effect of government consumption spending 
is significantly negative in this specification. We conclude that it is not unobservable, time-
invariant country-specific factors that let the effect of government size appear insignificant in 
column (3), but the handling of the variation over time. 
 
What kind of within-country variation in student achievement and government consumption is 
driving the results? Is it country-specific trends, or fluctuations around the trends? Figure 2 
above suggests that some countries exhibit a trend-like development in student achievement. 
To investigate this question, column (5) in Table 4 expands the model with country-specific 
time trends. Then the effect of government consumption increases to about the same 
magnitude as in the model without country-specific fixed effects in column (2), and becomes 
highly significant again. Thus, it seems like it is the variation around country-specific trends 
that accounts for the association between government consumption and student achievement. 
This result is independent of whether the model includes time-specific fixed effects or not, 
and the increase in significance from the model in column (3) to the one in column (5) is not 
related to the fact that the number of countries that contribute to identification is necessarily 
smaller in the latter model. 
 
In columns (6) through (8) of Table 4 we estimate the same models restricting our sample to 
OECD countries, to ease comparison with Table 5 below. We define the subsample of OECD 
countries by membership in the year 2000, but test later the robustness of our results for post-
communist period effects (see section 5.5.). In the OECD sample, the effect of government 
consumption is significant in the model without country fixed effects (column (6)), with its 
coefficient size appearing independent of whether country fixed effects and country-specific 
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trends are included in the model or not (columns (7) and (8)). The effect of about -1 is similar 
to that for the world sample. In columns (7) and (8), however the standard errors are relatively 
large. Nevertheless, the variation that drives these results appears to differ between OECD 
countries and non-OECD countries. While the variation across country-specific trends aids 
identifying a strong effect for the whole sample, inclusion of trends in the OECD sample does 
not influence the effect of government size.   
 
In sum, we identify a negative impact of government consumption spending on student 
achievement. This evidence is in accordance with our hypothesis that a more generous welfare 
system generates disincentives for educational investment. The result indicates that when 
government consumption spending increases by 0.1 log-points, student achievement is 
reduced by about 0.1 “core” country standard deviations. 
 
5.2. Social expenditures 
Table 5 presents results for government total social expenditures, measured as share of GDP, 
available for 28 OECD countries, resulting in a sample of 121 observations. Column (1) 
shows that the unconditional correlation between welfare transfers to households and student 
achievement is negative and significant at 5 percent level.20 Inclusion of co-variates even 
increases the effect of social expenditures both in terms of magnitude and statistical 
significance (column (2)). Also within OECD countries, there are positive impacts of GDP 
and adult education attainment in the population. When country fixed effects are included 
(column (3)), the coefficient of social expenditures is still significant at the 5 percent level, but 
larger in magnitude. Interestingly, it is of similar size as the point estimate of government 
consumption spending in Table 4. Column (4) shows that the results are not sensitive to 
whether the model includes time-specific fixed effects or a common time trend. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
However, when including country-specific time trends, the performance-lowering impact of 
social expenditures completely disappears (column (5) of Table 5). We conclude that it is 
country-specific trends that drive the results, which indicates that in the OECD sample there 
are some systematic medium-term changes in government policy that students and parents 
react on.  
 
                                                
20 The full sample includes also Luxembourg, including 29 OECD countries and 124 observations. In this full 
sample, the simple negative and significant correlation observed in column (1) persists with a coefficient of -
0.488 and a standards error of 0.223.  
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In the last part of Table 5 we distinguish between different components of social expenditures 
relating to specific social policy areas such as health, family care, labor market, pension 
system, etc. In column (6) we replace total social expenditures with all its various 
components. Note that the information on some components are missing in several countries 
which reduces our regression sample. Nevertheless, all components have a negative sign as 
expected, except for ‘health care spending’, ‘other spending’, and ‘family allowances’. 
Notably, the spending category ‘other spending’ is of a rather ‘kitchen-sink’ nature so that its 
estimate is not easy to interpret. The positive effect of family allowances is in fact significant 
at the 10 percent level, which may indicate that relaxing parents’ budget constraints in the 
poorest families may have an attainment-increasing effect on their children.  
 
The positive correlations among the different social expenditure components may contribute 
to their heterogeneous and mainly insignificant effects in column (6). Thus, we have run 
regressions including each of the components separately. In all cases, the coefficient estimates 
are negative, except for family allowances. Columns (7) and (8) in Table 5 report the two 
single cases of a minimum statistical significance at the 10 percent level. Both payments on 
active labor market policies and pension spending lower students’ test scores, each with 
significance at 1 percent. Since the former constitutes only a small part of total social 
expenditures, the negative effect of social expenditures in columns (1) to (4) seems to a large 
part to be driven by pension spending.21  
 
Taken all together, Table 5 shows that the effect of social spending in OECD countries is in 
accordance with our hypothesis that government redistribution activities create disincentives 
for students’ human capital investment. Among the different types of welfare transfers, it is 
pension benefits that contribute most to this effect. Possibly, because of path dependency in 
policy-making, current changes in spending on pensions may have a strong predictive power 
on governments’ future pension system policies, which are strongly redistributive in nature: in 
most developed countries, on the one hand, pensions systems guarantee an income-
independent minimum rent to every contributor, while, on the other hand, they place a cap on 
the maximum rent, equalizing rent incomes in the non-active elderly population.  
 
5.3. Tax progressivity 
Table 6 uses the same model specifications as Table 4, but replaces the government 
consumption variable with a 10-point scale index of the top marginal income tax rate, adjusted 
for the income bracket, a measure of progressivity of the income tax system. For this welfare 
state generosity measure, there is a significant negative correlation with student achievement 
                                                
21 We are unable to exclude the possibility that more public expenditures on pension may equally proxy for a 
large body of civil servants. In this case, the prospects of becoming a civil servant with high job security and 
generous retirement options may equally lower effort in mandatory schooling.  
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for the whole sample (column (1)), but the effect disappears when we include the control 
variables national income, population size and educational attainment in the population 
(column (2)).22 However, in the models with country-specific fixed effects in columns (3) and 
(4), the tax progressivity coefficient is significant at five and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Column (5) suggests that the development of tax income progression over time is not captured 
by country-specific time trends, as the coefficient estimate as similar to those in columns (3) 
and (4), which exclude such country-specific trends. When the index of income tax 
progressivity increases by one standard deviation, which is about 2.5 points, student 
achievement is reduced by 0.21 adjusted “core” country standard deviations.23  
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
How the effect of the variable of interest changes when we alter the model specification varies 
greatly between the government spending, social transfers and tax progressivity models 
(Tables 4-6), which indicates that the variables have very different features.24 Nevertheless, 
the main result for all measures of welfare state generosity is that they tend to reduce student 
achievement. The quantitative effects of the adjusted top tax rate are difficult to compare to 
the other variables since using an index variable makes quantitative predictions difficult.  
 
Regarding OECD countries, there is a strong negative effect of tax progressivity (column (6)) 
when the model does not include country fixed effects, but the effect disappears when country 
fixed effects are added. This finding is similar to the pattern observed for government 
consumption spending in the OECD countries (columns (6) to (8) of Table 4). In Table 6, it 
most possibly suggests that the conditional within-country variation of tax progressivity is too 
small to identify a statistically significant effect. Overall, using a measure of tax progressivity, 
we find convincing support for our hypothesis that students’ learning efforts decrease as the 
redistributive activities of the government expand.  
 
5.4. Generosity of the welfare system 
                                                
22 If we include the observations with missing control variables, the number of observations increases from 180 
to 206. Then the correlation and significance is very similar to the results reported in column (1) (coefficient of -
0.141 and standarrd error of 0.058).   
23 When using lead and lags by about one year of tax progressivity in place of interpolated values every 5th year, 
we obtain qualitatively similar results. For example, re-estimating the models in columns (1) to (3) – that is the 
models with no fixed effects, only time fixed effects and two-way fixed effects - , the results are (standard error) 
-0.137 (0.056), 0.023 (0.054) and -0.126 (0.039), respectively, and very close to the estimates reported in Table 
6.  
24 The correlation coefficient between government consumption spending (log) and the top marginal tax rate 
index is -0.44, and for the social spending (log) in OECD countries -0.30. Please note that financing of 
government activities also occurs through corporate taxation and indirect taxes on e.g. consumption goods. 
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The sizes of government consumption and social spending, expressed in percentage of GDP, 
are commonly viewed as proxies for the generosity of redistributive activities by the 
government. However, in principle, generosity of social transfers can be more directly 
assessed when values per recipient of social benefits in place of per capita numbers are 
employed. However, precise information on number of recipients is not easily available. Thus, 
we analyze the effects of welfare state generosity by estimating models with those selected 
components of social expenditures for which appropriate population shares serving as proxies 
for number of recipients are available. We employ either the share of elderly in the population 
or the share of unemployed in the active population. Indeed, omission of beneficiary measures 
might have biased our previous results as the spending estimates might capture population 
composition effects: simple correlations of the spending measures with the number of their 
specific beneficiaries are large.25  
 
In Table 7 we present results for models with measures of the number of recipients included. 
Taken all together, the results are not sensitive to inclusion of proxies for the number of 
beneficiaries. Pension spending and active labor market policy spending still exert a student 
performance lowering impact when the share of elderly and the unemployment rate, 
respectively, are included in the model (columns (1) and (2)), while the effects of 
unemployment and health care spending remain insignificant (columns (3) and (4)). The 
similarity of the coefficients on the spending variables with the original models reported in 
Table 5 suggests that the bias from using spending measured per GDP (conditional on 
population size) in place of per recipient is rather small. Regarding pension spending in 
column (1), the significance level is reduced to 5 percent when the share of elderly is 
included. While the share of the population above 60 years of age is insignificant, the test of 
joint significance clearly suggests that both variables are jointly related to student 
achievement. The effect of active labor market policies spending is equally lowered in 
significance (now at 5 percent level) when the unemployment rate is included (column (2)), 
while this time the test of joint significance clearly suggests that only one of the variables is 
related to student achievement.  
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
5.5. Robustness analyses 
                                                
25 The correlation coefficients between unemployment spending and unemployment rate is 0.51 and between 
pension spending and the share of the population above the age of 60 is 0.86. The correlation between active 
labor market policy spending and the unemployment rate is only 0.17. 
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The student test scores from the 1980s are not average results for jointly conducted 
Mathematics and Science tests as those achievement tests in the post-1990 period, but 
separate tests on the two subjects. Another reason for restricting the sample to the post-1990 
period is that many argue that test designs and test procedures have improved over time. 
Therefore, the dependent variable may incorporate a larger measurement error in the 1980s 
than in later periods. Table 8 presents results for regressions on the subsample for the 1990-
2003 period. Columns (1)–(3) in the table show that the coefficients of all three measures of 
welfare state - government consumption spending, social transfers, and income tax 
progressivity - are in fact larger in this subsample compared to the full sample that includes 
the pre-1990 tests, although the effect of government consumption spending is still 
insignificant in the model with time-specific fixed effects. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
It might also be argued that government spending and social spending are proxies for 
educational expenditures. Notice, however, that the typical finding in the literature, both from 
studies using single country data and international data, is that educational expenditures and 
teacher-student ratios have at most a minor effect on student performance (e.g. Hanushek and 
Luque 2003). If, still, educational expenditures or education quality have a positive effect on 
student achievement, their exclusion will bias the effect of welfare state size in our previous 
models since these variables are likely to be positively correlated. Thus, our previous 
coefficient estimates in Tables 4 to 6 may rather be biased downwards in absolute terms, 
providing a lower bound of welfare state effect. In columns (4) to (9) of Table 8 we add to our 
model educational expenditures per pupil in primary schools as a percentage of GDP and 
pupil–teacher ratios in primary schools from the World Bank education database.26 The 
effects of educational expenditures and pupil–teacher ratio appear insignificant in all but one 
specification. Most important, the effects of government consumption, social expenditures, 
and the progressivity of the income tax system remain qualitatively unchanged when these 
measures of resource use and school quality in primary education are accounted for. Overall, 
we find no indication that the generosity of the welfare system and government public goods’ 
creation proxies previously unobserved educational expenses or school quality.  
 
We have also investigated whether the choice of functional form of the empirical model is 
important. One may argue that it is not short-term fluctuations in the independent variables 
                                                
26 For secondary education, the number of observations was insufficient. The correlation coefficients of per pupil 
spending in primary education with our government consumption and social spending exceed well 0.5, while 
those with pupil-teacher ratio in primary education are -0.76 and -0.29, respectively. 
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that are important, but the development in the medium or long term. We have carried out 
identical regressions as reported in Tables 4-6 using 5-year moving averages of the 
independent variable in place of using current values. The findings for government 
consumption spending appear partly sensitive to the choice of time window, although a robust 
and large performance lowering effect at the 1 percent level remains if country-specific time 
trends are included. The effect of social spending appears insignificant throughout, albeit their 
coefficients prevail in size and direction. In contrast, the student performance lowering impact 
of active labor market policies spending and pension benefit spending is strongly supported.27 
Estimation of 5-year moving averages corroborates the results for progressivity of the tax 
system for OECD countries (analogously to Table 6), while the coefficients for the full 
country sample are now smaller and insignificant, albeit all with negative signs.28 Overall, the 
results for welfare state generosity appear insensitive to changes in model specification and 
sample selection.    
 
One interesting question is whether the effect of welfare state generosity carries over to non-
compulsory education. However, international comparative data back to the 1980s are scarce, 
in particular for upper secondary and tertiary education. Table 9 presents results for one 
measure of student performance that can be constructed for the same period as our analysis of 
student achievement on tests. The dependent variable is the survival rate to a lower secondary 
degree, defined as the share of the students starting lower secondary education who obtain the 
degree (typically at age 16). The data source is the World Bank (WDI, 2007, updated 2014). 
We use the same time period 1980 – 2003 and the same countries as for the main analysis 
above. However, since this variable is measured more regularly than student achievement in 
TIMSS and PISA tests, we have more observations. The mean value in the different samples 
used in the regressions is presented in Table 9. It is relatively common not to participate in 
education up to the graduation from lower secondary education. The mean survival rate is 
83% and 88% in the full sample and the OECD sample, respectively. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 9 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
Overall we find insignificant effects of the generosity of the welfare state on lower secondary 
education student survival rates in the full sample, but significantly negative effects of income 
                                                
27 Significant at least at the 5 percent level. In addition, housing subsidies appear now conducive to student 
performance, (at the 5 percent level) in a similar manner as family allowances in the current value model. 
28 We have also investigated the sensitivity to the assumed functional form in logs. The analogous results for 
government consumption in Table 4 are similar and show, again, the importance of country-specific time trends 
to identify the effect of size of welfare state in the world sample. In contrast, the coefficients for social spending 
in the OECD become insignificant, suggesting a model misspecification. Results for single social spending 
components are, however, comparable to the results in Table 5. 
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tax progressivity and, in tendency, of government consumption spending for the OECD 
countries. In contrast, social welfare spending in OECD countries exerts no such effect, but 
some coefficients on its subcomponents point into the expected direction (not reported). I 
contrast to the analyses for the PISA/TIMSS data in Tables 4-8, the share of non-OECD 
countries in the regression sample of Table 9 is larger. It is possible that government spending 
is conducive to student attainment in developing countries (reducing the risk in future income, 
but also through substantially lowering financial investment costs in education) – we leave the 
question of the role of welfare state generosity in developing countries to future research.    
 
 
6. Conclusion 
The recent publications of international comparative student achievement tests such as PISA 
and TIMSS have spurred the debate on quality of public education in many countries. While 
most of the discussion has been centered around educational resource use and school 
organization, analyses of macro incentives implicit in government’s economic policies are 
limited.  
 
This paper studies the relationship between welfare state generosity and individuals’ 
investment in human capital during compulsory education. We estimate differences-in-
differences models accounting for unobserved country heterogeneity for the period 1980-2003 
using international test scores in mathematics and science made comparable across testing 
institutions and test years. Our results clearly suggest that the generosity of the welfare state 
has a deteriorating impact on student performance. This finding is corroborated when 
analyzing survival rates to the lower secondary degree as an alternative measure of student 
performance. Both the effect of government consumption spending per capita, the degree of 
progressivity of the income tax system, and, for OECD countries, the size of direct social 
transfers to households have a significant negative effect on student achievement in 
PISA/TIMSS. For the monetary measures of government activity we find that an increase by 
10 percent reduces student achievement by about 0.1 standard deviations.   
  
However, one needs to be cautious when drawing policy implications from our empirical 
results: the fact that findings in form of econometric ‘point estimates’ always must be 
interpreted as marginal, ‘local’ changes. Furthermore, our findings are for high- and middle-
high- income countries only – whether similar results can be found in developing countries 
context remains an open question. 
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Table 1. Data sources description 
Year Test organization Acronym Test subjects  
Test age 
or grade Countries Data source 
1980-81 IEA SIMS Mathematics 13 years 3 in 1980 14 in 1981 
Lee and Barro (1997) 
Travers and Westbury (1989) 
1983-85 IEA SISS Science 14 years 
11 in 1983 
11 in 1984 
1 in 1985 
Postlethwaite and Wiley (1992) 
1990-91 IAEP IAEP Mathematics and Science 13 years 
2 in 1990 
17 in 1991 Lee and Barro (1997) 
1994-95 IEA TIMSS Mathematics and Science Grade 8 
4 in 1994 
36 in 1995 timss.bc.edu/ 
1998-99 IEA TIMSS-repeat Mathematics  and Science Grade 8 
6 in 1998 
31 in 1999 timss.bc.edu/ 
2000-02 OECD PISA 2000 Mathematics and Science 15 years 
32 in 2000 
9 in 2002 www.pisa.oecd.org 
2002-03 IEA TIMSS 2003 Mathematics and Science Grade 8 
7 in 2002 
38 in 2003 timss.bc.edu/ 
2003 OECD PISA 2003 Mathematics and Science 15 years 40 in 2003 www.pisa.oecd.org 
Note. For some countries separate scores are reported for different parts of the country. We have calculated mean 
country averages by using population as weight. IEA (except the 1983/84 test) and IAEP tests are conducted in 
the fall in the southern hemisphere and in the spring in the northern hemisphere. PISA 2000 originally only 
included five non-OECD countries, but nine additionally non-OECD countries conducted the same test in 2002. 
 
 
Table 2. Types of social expenditures in OECD countries 
Policy area Programs 
Old-age Pensions, early retirement pensions, home-help, residential services for the 
elderly.  
Survivors Pensions and funeral payments.  
Incapacity-related Care services, disability benefits, benefits accruing from occupational injury 
and accident legislation, employee sickness payments.  
Health Spending on in- and out-patient care, medical goods, prevention.  
Family Child allowances and credits, childcare support, income support during 
leave, sole parent payments.  
Active labour market policies Employment services, training youth measures subsidised employment, 
employment measures for the disabled.  
Unemployment Unemployment compensation, severance pay, early retirement for labour 
market reasons. 
Housing Housing allowances and rent subsidies. 
Other social policy areas Non-categorical cash benefits to low-income households, other social 
services; i.e. support programmes such as, food subsidies, which are 
prevalent in some non-OECD countries.  
Note. Source is Social Expenditure 1980-2003, OECD 2007, p.8. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of government consumption and social expenditures 
 Obser-vations Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
overall 
Standard 
deviation 
within 
countries 
Minimum 
value  
Maximum 
value  
General government consumption 
spending, percent of GDP 
232 
(All) 17.65 5.39 1.46 5.69  41.47 
General government consumption 
spending, percent of GDP 
124 
(OECD) 18.90 4.22 1.05 10.08 29.62 
Public sector social expenditures, 
percent of GDP 
124 
(OECD) 19.62 5.61 1.62 2.8 32.5 
Active labor market policy 
spending, share of GDP 
120 
(OECD) 0.61 0.44 0.20 0 2.2 
Public health spending, share of 
GDP 
124 
(OECD) 5.56 1.28 0.55 1.4 8.3 
Family allowance spending, share 
of GDP  
124 
(OECD) 1.90 1.08 0.31 0 4.1 
Unemployment benefit spending, 
share of GDP 
120 
(OECD) 1.17 0.90 0.44 0 4.4 
Pension spending,  
share of GDP 
124 
(OECD) 6.38 2.76 0.76 0.6 12.8 
Housing spending,  
share of GDP  
102 
(OECD) 0.42 0.39 0.17 0 1.8 
Other social spending,  
share of GDP 
99 
(OECD) 4.00 1.38 0.64 1.50 8.90 
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Table 4. The effect of government consumption on student achievement 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Gov. consumption spending, 
percent of GDP (log) 
0.237 -1.462** -0.650 -1.021* -1.596** -1.100** -1.060 -1.086 
(0.429) (0.378) (0.509) (0.486) (0.558) (0.377) (0.945) (1.551) 
GDP per capita (log) - 1.502** 1.234* 1.123* 2.056** 0.483 1.451 3.735* 
 (0.213) (0.485) (0.475) (0.748) (0.292) (0.698) (1.473) 
Percentage secondary school 
attained among adults (log) 
- 0.763** 0.510 0.736* 2.238** 1.268** 0.424 1.454 
 (0.292) (0.409) (0.371) (0.836) (0.271) (0.639) (1.052) 
Population size (log) 
- 0.040 2.279* 1.515 -8.492 -0.048 5.221* -11.04 
 (0.77) (1.046) (0.978) (6.758) (0.62) (2.241) (8.728) 
Trend 
- - - -0.041** - - - - 
   (0.014)     
         
Country fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes	  
Country-specific trends No No No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 208 208 208 208 208 128 128 128 
No of countries 59 59 59 59 59 28 28 28 
Sample All All All All All OECD OECD OECD 
R2 0.0015 0.455 0.943 0.937 0.982 0.301 0.851 0.932 
R2 (within) - - 0.222 0.133 0.740 - 0.298 0.679 
Note. Absolute standard errors in parentheses, +, * and ** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, 
respectively.. 
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Table 5. The effect of social expenditures on student achievement 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)	  
         
Gov. social expenditures, 
percent of GDP (log) 
-0.453** -0.670** -0.997* -0.899+ 0.505 - - - 
(0.223) (0.230) (0.464) (0.457) (1.070)    
GDP per capita (log) - 0.717* 0.523 1.508+ 6.500** -0.686 0.546 -0.008 
 (0.315) (0.895) (0.863) (2.355) (1.262) (0.872) (1.000) 
Percentage secondary school 
attained among adults (log) 
- 1.225** 0.548 0.433 0.572 -0.026 0.671 0.444 
 (0.275) (0.627) (0.604) (1.167) (1.255) (0.6216 (0.704) 
Population size (log) - -0.028 4.448+ 2.865 -11.63 -2.474 3.653 4.268 
 (0.61) (2.398) (2.371) (9.178) (4.845) (2.323) (3.132) 
Trend - - - -0.031 - - - - 
   (0.022)     
Pension spending (log) - - - - - -2.470* -0.986** - 
     (1.033) (0.333)  
Active labor market policy  
spending (log) 
- - - - - -0.392 - -0.576** 
     (0.298)  (0.191) 
Unemployment spending (log) - - - - - -0.317 - - 
     (0.210)   
Family allowances (log) - - - - - 0.824+ - - 
     (0.422)   
Health care spending (log) - - - - - 0.208 - - 
     (0.814)   
Housing spending (log) - - - - - -0.042 - - 
     (0.198)   
Other spending (log) - - - - - 0.912 - - 
     (0.667)   
         
Country fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-specific trends No No No No Yes No No No 
Observations 121 121 121 121 121 80 121 113 
No of countries 28 28 28 28 28 19 28 28 
R2 0.033 0.339 0.861 0.835 0.932 0.825 0.868 0.863 
R2 (within) - - 0.258 0.118 0.665 0.571 0.293 0.376 
Note. Absolute standard errors in parentheses, +, * and ** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, 
respectively. The coefficient on social expenditures in column (5) becomes negative but remains insignificant if 
model (5) is estimated on the same sample as column (6).  
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Table 6. The effect of tax progressivity on student achievement 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Income tax rate progressivity 
-0.172** -0.009 -0.086* -0.074+ -0.074 -0.133** -0.025 0.018 
(0.061) (0.059) (0.042) (0.039) (0.057) (0.046) (0.050) (0.066) 
GDP per capita (log) - 1.297** 1.113* 1.031+ 2.118+ 0.001 1.399+ 4.794** 
 (0.226) (0.558) (0.523) (1.197) (0.258) (0.772) (1.534) 
Percentage secondary school 
attained among adults (log) 
- 0.945** -0.601 -0.51 1.013 1.403** -0.067 0.637 
 (0.336) (0.496) (0.449) (1.043) (0.285) (0.671) (1.258) 
Population size (log) 
- 0.109 0.654 -0.632 0.857 0.005 4.553 -1.245 
 (0.085) (1.245) (1.178) (10.023) (0.061) (2.789) (10.999) 
trend 
- - - -0.006 - - - - 
   (0.017)     
         
Country fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County specific trends No No No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 180 180 180 180 180 116 116 116 
No of countries 56 56 56 56 56 28 28 28 
Sample All All All All All OECD OECD OECD 
R2 0.043 0.387 0.958 0.952 0.983 0.280 0.855 0.939 
R2 (within) - - 0.188 0.066 0.674 - 0.290 0.700 
 
Note. Absolute standard errors in parentheses, +, * and ** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, 
respectively. 
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Table 7. Generosity of the welfare state: OECD countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GDP per capita (log) 0.766 -0.156 0.975 1.029 
(0.919) (1.340) (1.211) (0.963) 
Percentage secondary school attained 
among adults (log) 
0.707 0.747 1.578+ 0.357 
(0.658) (0.832) (0.846) (0.668) 
Population size (log) 2.969 2.919 5.581+ 2.619 
(2.437) (3.523) (2.885) (2.518) 
Pension spending (log) -1.057* - - - 
 (0.502)    
Active labor market policy  - -0.544* - - 
spending (log)  (0.209)   
Unemployment spending (log) - - -0.112 - 
   (0.182)  
Health care spending (log) - - - 0.104 
    (0.590) 
Share of elderly (log) -0.783 - - -2.048* 
 (0.964)   (0.868) 
Unemployment rates - -0.027 0.000 - 
  (0.032) (0.037)  
     
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 110 110 113 110 
Countries 27 28 27 27 
R2 0.8632 0.8687 0.8479 0.8544 
R2 (within) 0.3328 0.3995 0.3079 0.2902 
F-test of joint significance 5.5078 3.458 0.2524 3.1086 
(p-value) 0.006 0.0372 0.7776 0.051 
Note. Absolute t-values in parentheses, +, * and ** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 8. Post-1990 period and school quality measures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Gov. consumption expenditures, 
percent of GDP (log) 
-0.856 - - -0.924 - - -0.587 - - 
(0.569)   (0.637)   (0.550)   
Gov. social expenditures,  
percent of GDP (log) 
- -1.360* - - -1.496** - - -1.394** - 
 (0.537)   (0.563)   (0.511)  
Income tax rate progressivity - - -0.093+ - - -0.116* - - -0.132** 
  (0.054)   (0.046)   (0.049) 
GDP per capita (log) 0.554 0.659 0.412 1.579* 0.152 2.005** 1.347* 1.216 0.901 
 (0.577) (1.008) (0.676) (0.616) (1.024) (0.697) (0.542) (1.030) (0.618) 
Percentage secondary school  
attained among adults (log) 
-0.498 0.658 -1.039 -1.168+ -0.168 -1.426+ 1.154* 0.571 -0.166 
(0.717) (1.077) (0.878) (0.646) (0.868) (0.768) (0.533) (0.794) (0.725) 
Population size (log) 
2.836+ 4.303 1.579 1.178 6.258 0.906 1.647 2.266 0.628 
(1.557) (4.117) (1.771) (1.516) (4.087) (1.466) (1.190) (3.189) (1.363) 
Primary education expenditures  
per pupil, percent of GDP (log) 
- - - 0.412 0.433 0.579* - - - 
   (0.295) (0.341) (0.287)    
Pupil-teacher ratio in primary 
education 
- - - - - - -0.005 0.048 -0.003 
      (0.032) (0.031) (0.033) 
          
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 177 102 163 166 104 152 185 103 160 
Countries 58 28 56 52 27 50 58 27 55 
Sample All OECD All All OECD All All OECD All 
Time period 1990 – 2003 Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No 
R2 0.9617 0.8791 0.9626 0.9558 0.8740 0.9609 0.9484 0.8833 0.9645 
R2 (within) 0.2251 0.3290 0.1744 0.2377 0.3010 0.3161 0.2462 0.3398 0.2094 
F-test (social spending,  
school quality)    1.5582 3.749 4.3742 0.5928 5.2155 3.9535 
(p-value)    0.2156 0.029 0.0155 0.5545 0.0081 0.0226 
Note. Absolute t-values in parentheses, + * and ** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 9. The effect of welfare state generosity. Dependent variable is graduation rate at lower 
secondary education 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Gov. consumption spending, 
percent of GDP (log) 2.360 - 0.639 -5.260 - - - - 
 (2.568)  (5.158) (5.263)     
Income tax rate progressivity - -0.207 - - -0.726** -0.734** - - 
 (0.315)   (0.220) (0.245)   
Gov. social expenditures,  
percent of GDP (log) - - - - - - 1.396 3.838 
       (4.070) (4.081) 
GDP per capita (log) -0.373 -4.950 9.159* -14.05 9.213** 16.83+ 2.411 3.659 
(3.092) (3.731) (4.546) (10.22) (3.344) (9.308) (7.338) (13.63) 
Percentage secondary school 
attained among adults (log) 
6.297 5.034 23.50** 0.250 24.34** 0.114 22.75** 0.386 
(3.873) (4.449) (5.169) (0.747) (4.092) (0.594) (6.096) (0.716) 
Population size (log) 18.28** 15.34+ 19.68* 0.0196 14.35+ 59.07 3.102 -193.3+ 
 (5.654) (8.270) (9.873) (67.90) (7.733) (54.48) (17.86) (98.65) 
         
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country specific trends No No No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 497 338 188 188 154 154 165 165 
No of countries 55 48 22 22 21 21 21 21 
Sample All All OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD 
R2 0.00324 0.0177 0.0196 0.0916 0.0165 0.111 0.383 0.236 
R2 (within) 0.262 0.358 0.524 0.566 0.680 0.653 0.494 0.540 
Mean of dependent variable 82.67% 86.09% 87.80% 87.80% 89.18% 89.18% 88.02% 88.02% 
Note. Absolute standard errors in parentheses, +, * and ** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, 
respectively. 
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Appendix Table A1. Participating countries and within-country variation 
 
Number of 
relevant 
international 
tests 
Mean value 
dependent 
variable 
Difference between maximum and minimum values 
observed in the regression sample 
 
Dependent 
variable 
Log(government 
consumption) 
Log(Social 
expenditures) 
Income tax 
progressivity 
Albania 1 -3.17 0 0 - - 
Argentina 1 -2.86 0 0 - 0 
Armenia 1 -2.02 0 0 - - 
Australia 6 0.13 0.89 0.08 0.34 2 
Austria 3 0.18 0.57 0.10 0.05 0 
Bahrain 1 -3.81 0 0 - 0 
Belgium 4 0.12 0.57 0.10 0.05 1 
Botswana 1 -5.74 0 0 - 0 
Brazil 3 -4.45 1.93 0.01 - 0 
Bulgaria 4 -0.77 2.35 0.22 - 5 
Canada 7 0.11 1.05 0.24 0.34 2 
Chile 2 -4.07 0.87 0.11 - 0.4 
China 3 1.19 1.14 0.02 - 1.6 
Colombia 1 -5.46 0 0 - 0 
Cyprus 3 -2.37 1.01 0.04 - 3 
Czech Republic 4 0.47 1.36 0.11 0.15 2 
Denmark 3 -0.84 1.57 0.05 0.11 1 
Egypt, 1 -4.03 0 0 - 0 
Estonia 1 0.55 0 0 - 0 
Finland 5 0.36 1.31 0.16 0.20 1.6 
France 5 -0.09 1.29 0.08 0.27 2.4 
Germany 3 -0.44 0.49 0.03 0.04 2 
Ghana 1 -9.32 0 0 - 0 
Greece 3 -1.51 0.49 0.14 0.10 0 
Hong Kong 6 0.52 2.38 0.42 - 0 
Hungary 7 0.57 2.49 0.12 0.10 5 
Iceland 3 -0.71 1.73 0.16 0.20 2 
Indonesia 3 -3.39 0.68 0.21 - 1.2 
Iran 3 -3.19 0.72 0.28 - 5.6 
Ireland 4 -0.49 1.27 0.22 0.18 2 
Israel 6 -1.04 1.49 0.37 - 3.4 
Italy 6 -1.00 1.60 0.12 0.20 5.8 
Japan 6 1.49 1.00 0.25 0.54 3 
Jordan 3 -3.21 1.67 0.43 - 0 
Korea 6 1.24 1.94 0.18 0.81 4.2 
Kuwait 1 -4.95 0 0 - - 
Latvia 4 -1.05 1.32 0.16 - 2 
Lebanon 1 -4.05 0 0 - - 
Lithuania 3 -1.37 1.82 0.18 - 0 
Luxembourg 3 -1.35 1.26 0.17 0.22 0 
Macedonia 3 -2.68 0.82 0.08 - - 
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Malaysia 2 -0.57 0.07 0.35 - 0.4 
Mexico 2 -2.88 0.68 0.11 0.16 0 
Moldova 2 -1.99 0.32 0.64 - - 
Morocco 2 -5.41 1.19 0.09 - 0.2 
Mozambique 1 -8.79 0 0 - - 
Netherlands 6 0.79 0.83 0.12 0.27 2.6 
New Zealand 6 -0.28 1.39 0.17 0.15 1.8 
Nigeria 1 -2.58 0 0 - 0 
Norway 4 -0.60 1.09 0.18 0.12 2.2 
Peru 1 -4.77 0 0 - 0 
Philippines 3 -4.91 1.68 0.62 - 0 
Poland 3 -0.39 0.77 0.04 0.08 0 
Portugal 4 -2.03 1.47 0.15 0.47 1 
Romania 3 -1.86 0.50 0.88 - 4 
Russian Federation 5 -0.16 1.65 0.27 - 2 
Saudi Arabia 1 -5.76 0 0 - - 
Serbia and Montenegro 2 -1.44 1.11 0 - - 
Singapore 4 1.71 4.40 0.39 - 1 
Slovak Republic 3 0.12 0.71 0.06 0.09 1 
Slovenia 3 0.04 1.23 0.04 - 0 
South Africa 3 -8.56 2.00 0.08 - 1.4 
Spain 4 -1.03 0.78 0.05 0.06 4 
Swaziland 1 -2.50 0 0 - - 
Sweden 5 -0.30 1.17 0.12 0.13 5.6 
Switzerland 4 0.38 1.15 0.07 0.35 1 
Thailand 6 -1.37 1.76 0.29 - 1 
Tunisia 2 -3.33 1.44 0.01 - 0 
Turkey 2 -2.59 0.54 0.11 0 0.4 
United Kingdom 7 -0.28 1.35 0.19 0.13 6.2 
U.S.A. 7 -0.73 1.15 0.18 0.20 4.2 
Uruguay 1 -2.33 0 0 - 0 
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Figure 1. Kernel density of student achievement  
 
a) “Core” country observations      b) All observations    
    
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Country-specific development in relative student achievement.    
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Figure 3. Kernel density of change in student achievement 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Country-specific development in social expenditures as share of GDP 
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